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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PAUL BRAMEL and WILLIAM B. BROOKS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vsTHE STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.
11479

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is a review of an ordinary negligence action tried to
the court below on a question of warning to motorists with
reference to the freeway (l-15) ending at or near Ogden, Utah,
and contributory negligence of the driver which resulted in
Judgment for the Plaintiffs, Respondents, and against the
Defendant, Appellant, State of Utah.
STA TEMENT OF FACTS
On the 29th day of November, 1966, at approximately
8:00 p.m., a 1966 Kenworth Diesel Tractor with a 1963 Trailmobile refrigerated trailer unit failed to negotiate the offramp at the ending of I-15 at or near Ogden, Utah, and the
unit overturned resulting in considerable damage to the tractor
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and trailer unit, and to the cargo of cucumbers, and some injury to the person of the driver of the tractor, William B.
Brooks, one of the Respondants.
Some four to five hours earlier, Mr. Brooks had left Price,
Utah after a rest stop (R-57) on a planned Houston, Texas
to Spokane and Seattle, Washington haul (R-54). As he
traveled I-15 there had been some patches of fog (R-58) but
near and at the point of the accident, the fog had lifted
(R-58), and visibility was at least 20 - 25 yards (R-76 and
80).
DISPOSITION BELOW
The lower court found that the signs placed by the State
of Utah "gave virtually no warning to the motorist public ...
(so) that they would be able to negotiate with reasonable safety the exit at the freeway end" (R-31) ; that the driver
Brooks was free of contributory negligence (R-3 2) and awarded judgment to the Plaintiffs for property damage and personal
injury in the sum of $27,878.2 5, including interest, together
with costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an Order of this Court reversmg the
judgment of the court below and dismissing the action of the
Plaintiffs as a matter of law, or in the alternative remanding
for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT "AT
MOST" ONLY CERTAIN LISTED SIGNS HAD BEEN IN
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PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IS ERRONEOUS, AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE.
A complete reading of the transcript of the Trial fails
to disclose the evidentiary testimony from which the court
made the Findings of Fact, paragraph 5 (R-31). If the testimony of the Plaintiff, Brooks, is credited, there were only
four or five Chevron signs "back up the road" (R-64) and
one EXIT 2 5 MILES PER HOUR sign "just before you went
off onto the off-ramp" (R-65). The court having apparently
found that there were other signs up, appears not to have
credited the testimony of the driver Brooks on this point. The
clear testimony of the State's witnesses as to the signing of
the area prior to the opening of the freeway section involved,
on the other hand, appears to have been only partially credited
by the court. It does not clearly appear what basis the court
used in ascertaining the facts in this regard, accepting some of
the testimony and rejecting other evidence on the matter of
signs from the same witnesses. As stated in the Findings of Fact
(R-31), the following signs "at most" were up:
Freeway Ends One Mile
All Traffic Must Exit
2 5 Miles per Hour speed signs (black on yellow) -

Chevron channelizing signs (red and white) -

two

several

Unlighted Barricades (black on white)
2 5 Miles per Hour Exit speed sign (black on yellow)

Yellow arrow at north edge of exit
It is respectfully submitted that other than the very general testimony of Brooks, (obviously not accepted by the court
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below) that no signs were up at all except the Chevron signs
and the one 2 5 MILES PER HOUR sign, there is no dispute
in the record that the following signs were also in place at the
time of the accident:
Single Lane Ahead (R-146 and 147)
Black on yellow arrow (additional) (R-150 and 169)
In addition, it should be noted that the evidence clearly shows
that nearly all of these signs were reflectorized (R-145-147).
The existence of the SINGLE LANE AHEAD sign is
deemed to be of particubr importance. Through an extended
period of cross-examination, the driver Brooks insist that the
freeway went from three lanes to two lanes and then directly
to the off-ramp never h:iving narrowed to a single lane (R-7678). This is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, and
to the exhibits P-1, P-2, and P-4. In finding, therefore, that
"the State failed to give adequate, reasonable or sufficient
notice ... that traffic would be required to turn on to a one
lane . . . exit road . . . " (R-31) the failure of the court to
find that this sign was erected is not only erroneous, but reversible error. It is urged that when the actual number, type
and condition of signing clearly in place at the time of the
accident is recognized, the further finding of the court below and the judgment rendered thereon, is error as a matter
of law.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ON THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE SIGNS AS PLACED BY THE STATE FAILED
TO GIVE ADEQUATE, REASONABLE OR SUFFICIENT
NOTICE, AND IN FACT GAVE VIRTUALLY NO WARNING.
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At first blush, the issued would appear to be a strictly
factual consideration. However, the importance of this issue
has been statutorily realized in 41-6-20 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, wherein it is required that "The State Road Commission shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform
system of traffic control devices consistent with the provisions
of this act for use upon highways within the state. Such a
uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible, conform to the system then current as approved by the American
Association of State Highway Officials." To comply with this
statutory mandate, the commission follows the Manual on

Uniform Traffic Control Dei,ices for Streets and Highways
prepared by the American Association of State Highway Officials et al.(l) The record shows that there was conformity with
the minimum requirements plus some additional signing according to testimony (R-130 and 131).
Turning from the statutory requirements incorporated in
41-6-20 U.C.A. 1953 to the case law briefly, the general rule
is that a governmental highway authority is not negligent in
failing to erect and maintain warning signs or barriers unless
(a) the situation is inherently dangerous, or (b) such signs
or barriers are specifically required by statute. Ulve vs. City
of Raymond, 317 P 2d 908, 51 Wash. 2d 241 (1957). Concluding that the present situation is an inherently dangerous
situation, the degree of required signing devices would certainly not exceed that which reasonably prudent men would,
under the same or similar circumstances, consider to be sufficient. We submit that the basic standards followed in the
(I) Institute of Traffic Engineers, National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances, National Association of County Officials, American Municipal Association; published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Washingtno D.C.,
June, 1961.
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manual cited supra, should, as a matter of law, be sufficient
to constitute an appropriate warnmg for a non-negligent
driver.
We further submit that to determine the adequacy or inadeuacy of the signing, the court must look only at the evidence directly relevant to that issue. The court should not
speculate as to better methods of warning motorists nor should
it consider subsequent additions to the signing or structuring
of the roadway. It should limit its consideration to the issue
of whether a careful user would be secure under the present
circumstances. Shipley vs. City of Arroyo Grande, 208 P 2d
51, 92 C.A. 2d 748, (1949). Additional evidence such as intoxication of the driver or driving record, etc., would lend
evidence to the probabilities of an accident, but would add
nothing to the issue regarding the adequacy of the signing per
se. We would therefore suggest that there were ample signs to
warn a reasonably careful driver and the instant case should
lead to a remlt in harmony with such a conclusion. In Nelson
vs. City of Seattle, 16 Wash. 2d, 592, 134 P 2d, 89, ( 1943),
the court said that one sign, having the dimensions of three
feet by five feet, with the wording "danger ... when wet ...
speed 15" was sufficient, as a mattter of law, for the court
to conclude that the city was free from negligence in warning a
motorist of the danger of the up-coming wooden block pavement.
Therefore, the number of signs and the spacmg thereof,
mentioned above, would be sufficient to warn the reasonable
driver of pending danger and would certainly be contrary to
the finding of the court that there was "virtually no warning
to the motorist public".
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POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DRIVER,
BROOKS, OPERATED THE UNIT IN A REASONABLE
AND PRUDENT MANNER.
Except for the self-serving statements of Plaintiff Brooks
(R-65) which is contradictory to his previous testimony, as the
record clearly shows (R-64 and 65), all of the competent,
believable evidence, and particularly the physical facts not in
dispute, argue persuasively for a finding of negligence on the
part of Brooks as a matter of law. Elsewhere in this Brief, it
is pointed out that between one mile of the off-ramp and the
off-ramp in question, the State of Utah was found by the
court to have erected some ten or more warning and information signs regarding the ending of the freeway and the exit
speed, etc., in connection with this highway. The Plaintiff
Brooks insists that he didn't see any signs except the Chevron
signs and the last 2 5 MILES PER HOUR exit sign (R-64
and 6 5) . In view of the courts finding that there were at least
twice that many signs in place, the driver, Brooks, stands convicted on his own testimony of having failed to see what was
there to be seen, ::md thus of negligence as a matter of law.
We urge that it is not within the realm of logic that a person
driving in a "reasonable and prudent manner" (R-31-32)
would have seen the signs which are found to have been in
place and still failed to negotiate the off-ramp in question. The
whole import of the signs which were found to be in place
is that conditions ahead were changing and adverse, requiring
a relatively dow speed of 2 S miles per hour from the freeway
speed of 70 miles per hour. What do three signs EXIT 2 5
MILES PER HOUR mean? And what do the other warning
signs mean?
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This court has heretofore held that "where the undisputed
facts are of such a character that reasonable minds c:m arrive
at but one conclusion, namely that the injured party was not
exercising the degree of care imposed by law, it is the duty
of the court to declare such conclusion as a matter of law".
(Edmunds vs. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215) (see also Frank vs.
McCarthy, 188 P 2d 737, 112 Utah 422 ( 1948) on this point).
We urge that the court below, having found the State to have
erected some ten or more warning and informational signs
within one mile of the off-ramps was bound by that finding
to declare the failure of the driver to see and act upon the information thus disclosed to be negligent as a matter of law under the rule of the referenced case. In that same opinion, this
court stated:
"The law not only places upon a driver of an automobile the responsibility of seeing things which are
apparent, but charges him with the consequences of
failing to see what, in the exercise of ordinary care,
he should have seen".
In connection with the exit speed sign we submit, fur-

ther, that on the record the Pbintiff Brooks again stands convicted of negligence primarily upon his own testimony. Brooks
testified that visibility at the point of the accident was 20 - 2 5
yards, because "I was running with my lights on dim" (R-76
and 80). Yet in prior testimony on direct examination, Brooks
admitted that he did not see the sign, indisputably there to be
seen, until he was 20 to 25 feet from it (R-66) ! These facts are
totally inconsistent with the finding that Brooks was driving
in a "reasonable and prudent manner", but are strongly in-

dicative of the reverse.
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Taking the facts as we find them, there is a clear showing in the testimony that Brooks was negligent in connection
with this action on further grounds. The undisputed testimony
of the State (R-146) and the physical facts as they are disclosed by exhibits P-1 and P-4 is that the last EXIT 25 MILES
PER HOUR sign was placed approximately 50 feet from the
exit. Throughout his testimony, Brooks insists that he was not
exceeding 3 5 miles per hour as he approached the exit (R-58
and 7 6) and on cross-examination, he reduced this maximum
speed to 32 miles per hour because "I was taching about 1800"
(R-90). It is respectfully submitted that with approximately
7 5 feet to go before the exit, no driver driving reasonably and
prudently at a speed not in excess of 3 5 miles per hour, would
have any difficulty whatsoever in reducing his speed by 7 to 10
miles per hour.
Exhibits P-1 and P-4, taken after the accident, show convincingly that Brooks didn't even try to make the turn off,
but rather ran off the ramp almost immediately. It flies in
the face of reason to suppose that a person driving a motor
vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner, keeping a look-out
for warning and directional signs, can be traveling at a rate
of not to exceed 3 5 miles per hour, observe a sign requiring an
exit speed of 2 5 miles per hour some 7 5 feet before the need,
and still fail not only to negotiate the roadway safely, but in
fact to run off it immediately! Add to this the testimony of
the driver Brooks that he did not skid any wheel before the
overturn (R-67) and an incontrovertible case of negligence is
made out against the plaintiffs. The only logical conclusion
from the evidence is that Brooks either failed to see what was
there to be seen, or failed to consider and act non-negligently
on what he saw. In this connection, it is submitted that there
is some differential for safety over and above the posted min-
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imum, allowing safe vehicular negotiation of our highways
with speeds somewhat higher than posted, particularly when,
as here, the driver is ::t professional, with a modern, well
equipped motor vehicle. Accepting the testimony of the driver,
Brooks, at face value, he should have been able with no difficulty at all to negotiate the turn-off from I-15 with perfect
safety, and his failure to do so was conclusive evidence of his
negligent and careles'> operation of his motor unit which was the
proximate, if not the sole cause of the Plaintiffs damages.

POINT IV
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER, BROOKS, BARS
ANY RECOVERY BY THE DRIVER OR HIS EMPLOYER,
OWNER OF THE DAMAGED UNIT, FROM THE STATE
OF UTAH.
It is well settled that an employer, owner of a motor
vehicle who releases the motor vehicle to his employee and sends
him out on the business of the employer is barred from recovery for any loss or damages to his property, vehicle, and
cargo, where the negligence of the employee, is in any degree
a contributing factor in the damages or loss. (Frank vs. McCarthy, 188 P 2d 737, 112 Utah 422 (1948); Portre vs. Saunders, 143 P 2d 554, 19 Wash. 2d 561 (1943); Bailey vs. Jeffries - aves, Inc., 414 P 2d 503, 76 N. M. 278 (1966).
Indeed, this court has stated in a dictum, that an employer
may be held answerable in damages for the intentional tort of
his employee committed in the furtherence of his employer's
interest or (where) the employment is such that the use of
force could be contemplated in its accomplishments. Barney vs.
Jewel Tea Company, 104 Utah 292. Had the State of Utah
filed a counterclaim for damages to the property of the state
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destroyed by the negligence of Brooks, it would have been
entitled to recover any judgment rendered thereon against
both Brooks and his employer, Bramel, in the instant case.
The rule of respondeat superior is clearly and properly invoked in this connection, so that if the driver Brooks is guilty
of negligence, neither he nor his employer may recover for
damages to which such negligence has been in any degree a
cause.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Respondents, it is clear that the State of Utah, Department of
Highways was not negligent in any particular as it relates to
this action. The court found some ten or more reflectorized
signs placed by the state within one mile of the exit from the
freeway (R-31). The nature of the signs together with the
numbers, completely negates any reasonable finding of negligence on the part of the Appellant, State of Utah. The uncontroverted evidence is that the section of highway was signed
in compliance with the Manual on Traf fie Control Devices
as approved by the American Association of State Highway
Officials and as required by 41-6-20 U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
Indeed, the evidence justifies a finding that the signing of this
area exceeded the standards so established, which must be
deemed prima facie evidence of no negligence. There being absolutely nothing in the record to rebut this presumption, it is
submitted that the State of Utah was not and could not be
liable for negligence.
In any event, the State of Utah can not reasonably be
required to respond in damages to the Respondents because
the record is conclusive that on the testimony of the Plaintiff
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driver, Brooks, he was negligent as a mattter of law. Also,
as a matter of law, his negligence as an employee of the other
Respondent, owner of the motor unit, acting clearly within the
scope of his employment, serve to bar recovery from the Appellant, State of Utah.
It is submitted, therefore, that justice demands this case
be reversed and that judgment of dismissal be entered in favor
of the Appellant, State of Utah, as a matter of law, or in the
alternative, remanded for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY, ESQ.
Attorney General
MARK A. MADSEN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

